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Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea
Milenko MilUf*
I.

INTRODUCTION

T HE

FIRST SESSION of the Third Conference on the Law
of the Sea was held in New York, December 3-15, 1973, and
was devoted to organizational questions and to the preparation of
draft rules of procedure.
The Conference formed three Main
Committees to which different subjects were allocated. Substantive sessions were convened in Caracas, June 20-August 29, 1974
and in Geneva, March 17-May 9, 1975. At Caracas, the Main
Committee considered draft articles for a Charter of the Oceans.
The work of the Main Committees at Geneva consisted of the review of draft texts prepared by the committees at Caracas. During the review of the Caracas drafts each committee held formal
and informal meetings in an attempt to encourage delegations
which had maintained differing views to reach compromises or at
least to set out alternative formulas. At its plenary meeting on
April 18, 1975, the Conference decided to request that the chairman of each of the three Main Committees prepare a single
negotiating text covering the subjects entrusted to his committee.
On the eve of the closing Geneva session these negotiating texts
were submitted to the Conference.' These texts were to be considered as informal in character and were not to prejudice the position of any delegation nor represent any negotiated text or accepted
compromise.
The Geneva Session represents an advance over the Caracas
Session in two ways. First, the Geneva Session confirmed universal support of the 12 nautical mile territorial sea and also of a
200 nautical mile economic zone.
Second, the Geneva Session
produced a single negotiating text, while the Caracas drafts included alternative provisions. This evidences a certain narrowing
of the discussion limits, which could mean a step forward towards
agreement. Furthermore, the Single Negotiating Text constitutes a
* Observer for the World Peace Through Law Center at the Third Law of
the Sea Conference; Attorney, Patija, Yugoslavia; Laureat of the Sorbonne
University, Paris.
IInformal Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP 8/Pt. 1,
II, and III [hereinafter cited as Negotiating Text].
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genuine draft for the future Charter of the Oceans, which makes
agreement likely at the next session, to be held in New York. The
author attended the Geneva Session in the capacity of observer of
the World Peace Through Law Center. This paper represents
his interpretations of the Geneva Session. The paper will focus
primarily on issues that appeared for the first time within the
discussions of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, and on issues that
failed to receive proper attention at the First Conference on the
Law of the Sea, but which have since emerged as fundamental elements in the modern law of the sea. Such elements include the
common heritage of mankind, the exclusive economic zone beyond
the territorial sea, straits used for international navigation, and free
access of the land-locked countries to and from the sea. Primarily, this paper is intended to identify and discuss these crucial issues in the restructuring of the international law of the sea
and to determine how the formulations of these issues have been
altered between the Caracas and Geneva Sessions.
II. FROM GENEVA 1958 TO GENEVA 1973 WORLD ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE BACKGROUND
OF THE THIRD CONFERENCE
Rapid technological progress, the increasing importance of submarine nonliving resources and the corresponding desire of states
to claim extensive coastal state jurisdiction over them, and the desire to protect fishing interests, have made obsolete the results
of the First Conference on the Law of the Sea held in Geneva in
1958. To deal with these new problems an Ad Hoc Committee
was established in 1967 and, in the following years, was transformed into the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed
and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction
(Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed). The diversity
of interests among the states, as reflected in the discussions of the
Committee, revealed that the problems of equitable sharing of
submarine resources could not be solved without regard to the other
law of the sea issues. Recognizing the interrelation between the
many problems of the ocean space, the General Assembly assigned
the broad range of related issues to the Committee in 1970.2 At
2

The subjects were allocated to the three Main Committees as follows:

Items considered by the First Committee: International regime for the seabed
and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction; archeological and historical treasures on the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
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the same time, the General Assembly declared principles that were
3
to guide the establishing of a new regime governing the seas.
As a preparatory committee, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of the Sea-Bed studied these many problems and prepared a report which was submitted to the Third Conference on the Law of
the Sea.
The Third Conference on the Law of the Sea is devoted to the
outstanding problems of the law of the sea. It is considerably
more important than the first two Conferences because it is allembracing in its approach. Its aim is to produce a real Charter of
the Oceans. Recognition of the existing global economic and political situations which dictate changes in the law of the sea is important to the success of the Third Conference. The increasing
preoccupation of the developing countries with income redistribution is a predominant trend in the global political situation that
cannot be ignored. While the adoption of new approaches and
regulations concerning the sea has not yet occurred, there is a
growing awareness of the necessity to reconcile the opposing interests of the developed and the developing countries. The settlement of essential problems and the bridging of the gap between
these two categories of states represent the fundamental current
problems.
In particular, the world economic situation dictates the modification of the traditional principle of the freedom of the sea. This
principle can no longer serve primarily the interests of states having technological predominance. Freedom of exploitation by these
states has outlived its time and is inappropriate for modern law of
the sea.
Furthermore, social justice on the international level
requires that developing countries, including land-locked, shelflocked and other geographically disadvantaged countries, have
corresponding benefits from the living and nonliving resources of
the sea. Also, all countries need security from destruction of the
marine environment.
Items dealt with by the Second Committee: Territorial Sea; contiguous zone;
straits used for international navigation; continental shelf; exclusive economic
zone beyond the territorial sea; coastal state preferential rights beyond the
territorial sea; high seas; land-locked countries, shelf-locked states and states
with narrow shelves or short coastlines; rights and interests of states with broad
shelves; archipelagos; enclosed and semi-enclosed seas; artificial islands and
installations; islands.
Items allocated to the Third Committee: Preservation of the marine environment;
scientific research; development and transfer of technology.
3 Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and
the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749,
25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28 at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
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The deliberations of the Third Conference reflect the struggle
for the adoption of a new economic order inspired by the spirit of
Developing countries are today of the
international solidarity.
opinion that the moment is ripe for achieving concrete results;
however, the diversity of economic interests among the states has
created many differing views as to how these problems can be
solved. The major challenge to the Third Conference on the Law
of the Sea is the reconciliation of these conflicting interests. An
analysis of the deliberations of the main elements of the international law of the sea follows.
III. EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE BEYOND
THE TERRITORIAL SEA
Conceptual Framework
The concept of an exclusive economic zone originated from
the desire to extend coastal state jurisdiction over living and nonliving resources beyond the territorial sea in order to promote the
development of economically weak countries. The zone should be
conceived as a compromise between two competing interests: (1)
those of the coastal states and (2) navigational and commercial
interests of the other states. Thus, the concept of the economic
zone must not only recognize the interests of the coastal states
in the resources adjacent to the territorial sea, but also it must
protect the interests of all states in navigation and other legitimate
uses of the area.
The supporters of the economic zone considered it as the pivotal
feature in the new law of the sea. However, some African and
Latin American developing countries believed that it would be
better simply to demand a 200 nautical mile territorial sea. Other
countries opposed the zone because they believed it might endanger freedom of navigation and therefore become a source of
disputes. Therefore, in defining the concept of the economic zone
it was foreseen that the rights of the coastal states should be exercised without interfering with other states' legitimate uses of this
area with regard to freedoms of navigation, overflight, laying cables
and pipelines, and scientific research. Further, some believe that
the non-coastal states' right of innocent fishing within this zone
In other words, when the coastal
also should be guaranteed.
state does not catch the maximum allowable yield of fish stocks,
nationals of other states should have the right of innocent fishing.
In opposition, the argument for under-fishing was put forward in
support of the rights of third countries in the economic zone. In
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sum, a large majority of the countries favor the economic zone.
Today, it is welcomed as a zone of functional competences in
which coastal states will have sovereign rights over the resources
therein.
In defining the concept of the economic zone, particular interest should be given as to whether this zone may lead to a multiplication of zones with coastal states having different rights in
each zone. Whether it does depends upon the nature of the economic zone.
From the juridical viewpoint, it is questionable
whether this zone should be considered as some sort of extension
of the territorial sea, as a part of the high seas, or as an intermediate zone having some characteristics of both. The concept of
the economic zone should neither be equated with the territorial
sea nor be identified with the high seas. In the economic zone
the coastal state has no full sovereignty as it has in the territorial
sea, but has only some sovereign rights which exist in relation to
the natural resources. Restrictions on these rights are the obligations of the coastal state to ensure the rational utilization of renewable resources and the granting of innocent fishing to third
states.
The Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf
With the adoption of the economic zone, agreement will be
reached on the further extension of the authority of coastal states.
The conceptual basis of the exclusive economic zone also underlies
that of the continental shelf. Concerning the continental shelf
and the future development of sovereign rights, we said in our report to the Belgrade Conference:
Whatever the future control of the continental shelf may be, it
will have a profound effect upon the new legal institution of
the sovereign rights for exploration and exploitation. . . . This
institution was adopted in order to clarify more accurately the
recognized rights of the coastal states as being narrower than
those which contain the full concept of sovereignty. But to diminish the classical principle of sovereignty is to cripple it.
The present urge to enlarge the zone of exploitation of submarine riches leads us to believe that the mutilated concept of
4
sovereignty will become a thing of the past.
There exists the possibility that the areas of the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf would coincide. If this
happens, should the concept of the continental shelf be cast aside
SMili , Tie Expioraion and E~xploitationz of the Resources of the Ocean Bed, 5
L. REv. 153, 156 (1972).

WORLD
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as being outmoded? It would be easy to endorse such a solution if the zones coincided everywhere; however, that is not likely to
happen. According to Article 46 of the Single Negotiating Text of
the Second Committee, "[t]he exclusive economic zone shall not
extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured."5 Article 62 of the
same text assumes that the limit of the area in which the coastal
state has sovereign rights of exploration and exploitation - but in
no case will the limit exceed 200 nautical miles - is the outer
edge of the continental margin. 6 Thus, owing to the varying width
of their continental margins, some states could have a continental
shelf narrower than 200 miles. However, this is complicated by
the possibility of a coastal state having a continental shelf beyond
200 nautical miles, as is foreseen by Article 69, in which case the
state shall make payments or contributions in kind to the International Authority for the exploitation of the nonliving resources.
While the continental shelf may be of varying size, the economic
zone has a uniform size of 200 miles for all states.
Since there is no identity of geographical areas between the economic zone and the continental shelf, neither should there be
identity of legal concepts. For example, if the continental shelf
includes an area beyond the economic zone, its legal concept should
not be absorbed within that of the economic zone. Further,
identity of legal concepts is unlikely to occur, because the extension of exclusive rights beyond the 200-mile limit is incompatible
with the concept of the sea as the common heritage of mankind.
Abandonment of the continental shelf concept would be understandable, because it has generally been admitted that this concept needs revision. Moreover, the delimitation of the sovereign
rights of exploration of the area and the exploitation of the natural resources could logically be found within the framework of the
economic zone concept, rendering the concept of the continental
shelf obsolete. But, the way from logic to reality is not always
direct. From the above mentioned provisions of the negotiating
text one could conclude that the dominant trend is that the continental shelf should not be subsumed under the economic zone and
that both should coexist whether they be spatially distinct or not.
Nevertheless, coastal states' sovereign rights of exploitation should
be limited to the submarine area of the 200 miles. Otherwise,
states with a continental margin beyond 200 miles would be fa5 Negotiating Text, pt. II at 19.
6 Id. at 27.
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vored by having under their jurisdiction very wide submarine areas,
significantly diminishing the amount of natural wealth considered
as the common heritage of mankind.
The Contiguous Zone
For some, the economic zone concept also implied abandonment of the contiguous zone. Both have had the same raison d'etre.
The concept of the contiguous zone was introduced at the Conference for the Codification of International Law in 1930 in order
to prevent the extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles; and the
economic zone concept was conceived to prevent the extension of
the territorial sea beyond 12 miles by giving special rights to the
coastal states up to 200 miles.
The contiguous zone did not represent a duplication of the
territorial sea, since the substantive rights of coastal states in that
zone consisted only of certain specifically defined competences.
Since the state's sovereignty was not extended by the contiguous
zone, the demands of the coastal states for extension of the territorial sea have not ceased. The Second Conference on the Law of
the Sea was summoned to deal with the question of the width of the
territorial sea. Unable to find a solution for that question, the
participants at the Second Conference devoted much attention to
the introduction of a fishing zone in order to satisfy the fishing
interests of coastal states. When the First Sea Law Conference
adopted the legal concept of the continental shelf it seemed that
the question of the exploitation of the nonliving natural resources
on the bottom of the sea was resolved. Later, new aspirations
for wider national appropriation of submarine areas appeared, as
well as demands by some developing countries for better protection of their fishing rights in the adjacent waters to their territorial sea against distant water fishing by some maritime powers.
When the exclusive economic zone emerged as a major issue
at the Third Conference, it was understandable that its main aspect
would be fishing. From the provisions of the Single Negotiating
Text produced by the Geneva Session it appears that the economic
zone was intended to replace the concept of the fishing zone.
Among the sovereign rights of the coastal state in the zone, the
Geneva negotiating text includes exploitation of natural resources,
whether renewable or nonrenewable, of the bed, subsoil and the
superjacent waters. 7

I Negotiatin~g

Text, art. 45, pt. II at 19.
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There are two conflicting opinions concerning the coexistence
of the contiguous zone and the economic zone. The first is
based upon the different purposes of these two zones. The contiguous zone would be narrower within the larger economic zone.
In the contiguous zone, the only competence of the coastal state
is the prevention and the punishment of offenses of customs, fiscal,
sanitation and immigration regulations committed by a vessel or its
crew on the territory or in the territorial sea of the coastal state.
In the economic zone, the coastal state would have jurisdiction
over natural resources and the preservation of the marine environment. The coastal state also has legislative competence over the
whole zone for the above mentioned purposes; however, it does not
cover offenses committed in the contiguous zone.
Those -who support the opposite conception question why the
coastal state should be empowered in a narrower zone for a
determined category of infringements violating the maintenance
of good order; while in a wider zone, it has not only competence
to punish the infringements committed in the exploration and
exploitation of the natural resources, but also legislative competence.
If the concept of contiguous zone is kept, there is a question
about its proper location in the conventions. In the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 8 this
zone was placed in the text juridically regarding the territorial
sea. It is treated in the same way in the Geneva 1975 negotiating
text. This placement was criticized at the First Sea Law Conference.
The delegate of the United Kingdom, Mr. Gerald
Fitzmaurice, was persistent in looking for a logical solution to
include the contiguous zone in the Convention on the High Seas. 9
In support of his contention he stated that the competence of the
coastal states in the contiguous zone does not embrace the conInsisting on his proposal he
cept of coastal state sovereignty.
repeated it at the plenary meeting, but without success.' 0
His conception was not groundless. However, if the purpose is to include in one convention the rights of the coastal states
in different areas of the sea, then it would have been, in 1958,
more logical to characterize the convention as one on the rights
8 Done April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S.
205.
9 Done April 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S.
82.
10U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. II (Plenary
Meetings) at 69, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/38 (1958).
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of coastal states. Today, the criticism is anachronistic since the
work of the Third Conference hopefully will result in a convention on all issues in the law of the sea.
The High Seas
Once the economic zone had been defined spatially and
the coastal state's rights and obligations were known within
this zone, some suggestions were advanced that this zone should
still be considered as a part of the high seas. The opposing view
was that this zone should lie within the national maritime area.
The concept of the high seas as enumerated by provisions included
in the Geneva negotiating text can be considered classic. Article
47 recognizes the rights of all states to enjoy the freedoms of
navigation, overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines,
and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to navigation and communication. The second paragraph of Article 47
refers to the other articles concerning the high seas and their
application to the exclusive economic zone. One is Article 97
concerning "hot pursuit."
According to this article, hot pursuit
must commence when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within
the internal waters, the territorial sea, or the contiguous zone of
the pursuing state, and may only be continued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted. Since this formulation does not mention the economic
zone among the areas for the commencement of the pursuit, it
confirms the high seas character of the economic zone.
On
the other hand, those who view the economic zone as a zone of
functional competences of the coastal state have considered redefining "hot pursuit."
In their opinion, the economic zone
would entail limitation of areas of the high seas and consequently
of areas where the right of hot pursuit was traditionally exercised.
The coastal state's sovereign rights in the economic zone
do not lead to unconditional extension of the sovereignty of the
coastal state whereby it would be free to expropriate public areas
that were previously parts of the high seas. Furthermore, the
economic zone is assumed to be subject to a special regime of
cooperation among all states with substantial concession to the
coastal states.
While the rights of the coastal state should not include ownership rights in the economic zone, there is no reason to adhere to
the term "patrimonial" instead of "economic" for this newly
conceived zone. The expression "patrimonial sea" causes confu-
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sion in that it could be understood as applying also to the ownership of the superjacent water. Under the concept of the exclusive
economic zone, the rights of the coastal state are restricted only to
nonliving resources on the seabottom and living resources in the
water column. The superjacent waters remain high seas where
the freedom of navigation and other freedoms are safeguarded.
The term "patrimonial" might also be confused with the concept of common heritage of mankind. Both could be understood
as approaches that emphasize ownership. However, only the
common heritage of mankind works out a regime of common
patrimony of mankind; the patrimonial sea expresses the tendency to extend the national jurisdiction over a limited field of
activity of the coastal states. For these reasons, the term "patrimonial sea" is not appropriate for the new zone.
IV. LAND-LOCKED COUNTRIES
AND REGIONALISM
Provision for Free Access to the Sea by Land-Locked Countries
At the First Law of the Sea Conference, free access to and
from the sea was presented by the land-locked countries as a
question requiring theoretical and systematic solution.
Insurmountable difficulties arose in trying to define the problem.
Those who advocated a separate legal concept suggested recognizing it as a new politico-legal concept that would be wider than
the previous and still existing economic-technical concept of
transit.
Free access to and from the sea by the land-locked
countries failed to receive proper treatment in the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and the Convention on the High Seas. Article 14 of the former provides
that "subject to the provisions of these articles, ships of all
states, whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent
passage through territorial sea."
In the Convention on the
High Seas, Articles 2, 3 and 4 relate to the rights of non-coastal
states.
Nevertheless, as the aim of the Third Conference is to create an
equitable order on the seas for all countries, it is necessary to be
precise about the role of land-locked, shelf-locked and other geographically disadvantaged countries in the new system. Some
land-locked countries presented draft articles to the Preparatory
Committee, and later to the Conference, that the new norms of
the international law of the sea should ensure free access by land-
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locked countries to and from the sea, free access to the international seabed area, participation on an equal footing in the International Authority, and sharing in the benefits derived from
exploitation of the natural resources considered as the common
heritage of mankind.
The concerned countries estimated that by the Third Conference the time had come to accommodate their legitimate interests
and to include in the new convention detailed provisions with regard to the proposals, submitted by the land-locked countries in
the Kampala Declaration."
Under these proposals the land-locked
countries would no longer be dependent on the discretion of the
transit states and would have free and unrestricted access and
transit to and from the sea.
The Geneva Single Negotiating Text presented by the Second
Committee includes provisions that relate to the land-locked
countries. 12 While Article 108 mentions the exercising of freedom
of transit under conditions determined by bilateral, subregional, or
regional agreements, the text does not formally provide a substantive guarantee of such a right.
Regional Solutions
The interests of the land-locked countries have been taken into
account in defining the concept of the economic zone within regional arrangements. Because of the solidarity of interests among
states within a region, it is easier for the states of each region to resolve their own problems rather than to have solutions dictated to
them on a wider basis. Further, the concept of economic zone
provides a solid basis for regional solutions. A broad trend in favor
of subregional agreements has emerged as well as that of a "regional economic zone." Regional solutions reconciling interests in the
economic zone of riparians are more likely among the coastal
states and neighboring land-locked countries which have comparable
economic levels. If the regulation-making should be delegated to
the regions or subregions, a preliminary examination of the economic conditions on a geographic basis would facilitate the finding
of sensible provisions.
The concept of "matrimonial sea" was proposed by Caribbean
Sea riparians.
It is a concept by which land-locked countries
would benefit from the economic zone or patrimonial sea of the
11U.N.

Doc. A/CONF.62/23 (May 2, 1974).

12 Negotiating

Text, arts. 108-116, Pt. II at 40-41.
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riparians.
The matrimonial sea is characterized juridically by
undivided property among coastal states and economically by the
formation of an agency. The agency is associated with joint
ventures and is capable of engaging in technical, industrial and
commercial activities relating to the exploration of the zone and
13
the exploitation of its resources.
The land-locked countries firmly supported the concept of the
exclusive economic zone of all variants and believed that they had
found a guarantee of their right to participate in the exploitation
of the renewable and nonrenewable resources of the neighboring
economic zone on an equal footing with the coastal states.
V.

STRAITS USED FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION

One of the key issues for which an equitable solution was
sought was how to establish a generally accepted regime for straits
used in international navigation, a matter of continuing concern to
the international community. Closely linked to this question has
been the problem of defining this category of straits. In the Corfu
Channel case the International Court of Justice adopted the elements of usage and geography in its definition: an international
strait is one that connects two parts of the high seas and is used for
international navigation. 14 The Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone of 1958 transplanted this definition with
one alteration. In the Convention the right of unimpeded transit
includes for users of the straits a corresponding right of innocent
passage.' 5 Until recently, such a definition was not opposed, because the limit of the territorial sea was 3 miles, making innocent
passage applicable through international straits of less than 6
miles. But extension of the territorial sea to a width of 12 nautical miles would result in a large number of new international
straits up to 24 miles wide. With the proposed new width the regime of the high seas would cease to exist in approximately 100
straits.
Therefore, a new regime concerning straits would be
needed that would fairly balance the interests of coastal states and
flag states.
The new rules should be applied only to new straits wider than
6 miles because of their international importance for trade and
communications.
Straits narrower than 6 miles should remain
13R. Dupuy, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CURRENT PROBLEMS, 42-45 (1974).

14Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 4, 28.
IS The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.13/L.52 (1958), art. 14.
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governed as they are: as being outside major international seaways and accepted as part of the territorial sea. For this category
of straits, the regime of innocent passage is appropriate. Such a regime is recognized in the existing international law as based on
treaties, custom and rules of the coastal states.
With regard to straits between 6 and 24 nautical miles, the
major maritime powers have demanded the continuation of freedom
of navigation.
For example, the USSR considered such straits
"the focal points of international shipping routes because they were
the routes of the most intensive navigation. There [could] be no real
freedom of international navigation or international communica6
In
tions without free transit" for ships through these straits.
the opinion of the United States:
[T]he rights to establish a territorial sea up to 12 miles wide
had to be accompanied by treaty provisions for a non-discriminatory right of unimpeded passage through, over and under
straits for international navigation, while meeting coastal state
concerns with respect to navigational safety, pollution and security. 17
All delegations that supported free navigation through the new
straits pointed out that there was no justification for modifying
the regime of navigation or for distinguishing between merchant
ships and warships in the areas which had long been considered
as high seas. In their opinion, the innocent passage could give
coastal states the possibility of impeding free transit through such
a strait. States such as China favored maintainance of the same
regime for the new straits, opining that innocent passage meant
that passage would be granted to foreign vessels provided that
they did not prejudice the peace, good order and security of the
coastal state.
A sharp distinction was drawn between passage of merchant
vessels and warships in the discussion at the Third Conference.
It was unanimously agreed that the navigation of merchant ships
through straits must be guaranteed without restrictions, because
they serve international maritime traffic and trade and promote
international cooperation. By contrast, opinions were divided concerning warships. Those who advocated requiring coastal state
permission and preliminary notification for passage of warships
were sensitive to safeguard the sovereignty of the coastal state.
16U.N. Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. I
(Plenary Meetings) at 68 (1975).
17 Id. at 160.
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It was felt that the unnotified presence of warships, submarines
or military aircraft posed a threat to the security of the states
bordering straits.
In the Geneva Single Negotiating Text, the rights of "innocent
passage" as the exception and "transit passage" as the general
rule are recognized.
Transit passage is defined as "the exercise . . . of the freedom of navigation and overflight for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between
one area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and
another area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone." 18
Article 38 provides that all ships and aircraft shall enjoy the right
of transit passage; however, Article 39 places some obligations
upon the ships and aircraft while exercising this right.
The provision on the "right of transit passage" is a compromise. On the one hand, the great maritime powers that insisted
on the freedom of navigation could accept it as a satisfactory
solution for them, since it removes the concept of "innocent passage" from the new straits. Although the provisions dealing with
the transit passage do not expressly mention freedom of navigation,
circumstances imply how the right is to be exercised. On the
other hand, the coastal state, by the tacitly assumed freedom of
navigation under certain circumstances, is not deprived of its rights
in the new straits which were granted to it by the concept of
innocent passage. The deliberations in New York should reveal
whether the proposed formula of "transit passage" has struck the
balance between the interests of the coastal states in safeguarding
their security and other legitimate interests on the one hand, and
the interests of commercial navigation on the other.
VI.

INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY

While the seabed and its mineral resources beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction were recognized to be the common heritage
of mankind, many interrelated issues appeared with regard to this
new form of international cooperation. The common heritage of
mankind represents the legal institution of an undivided legacy of
joint heirs. In other words, all nations equally participate in the
distribution of the natural wealth of the ocean floor in their capacity as joint heirs.19 It was initially presumed that the new regime
18Negotiating Text, art. 38, pt. I1at 16.
11See M. MILI , COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND, (unpublished paper
presented on behalf of the World Peace Through Law Center to the Geneva
Session on the Law of the Sea, 1975).
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on the ocean floor in the international area should be embodied
in an Authority, the machinery of which would be representative
and democratic without favoring technologically advanced countries. But an obstacle to agreement emerged on the question of
how exploitation should be operated and who should exploit the
area. Developed countries insisted on an International Seabed
Authority that would grant licenses to contracting states, which
in turn would authorize physical or juridical persons for exploitation of minerals. In addition to oil, vital minerals like copper,
cobalt, nickel and manganese nodules are plentifully situated on the
ocean bottom. For this reason, it was not surprising to see that the
discussion on the operational system of deep sea mining generated
disputes between the developed and the developing states. The
developing countries expressed their concern that the industrialized
powers, by the licensee system, would take advantage of their advanced technology and appropriate directly or indirectly the seabed resources before the developing countries reached a technological level enabling them to exploit the resources by their own
means. Developing countries have hoped to prevent this by delaying effective exploitation, envisaging exclusive economic exploitation of resources by the Authority.
However, if the Authority were enabled to explore and exploit
the area on its own, it would initially meet difficulties of a financial and technological nature and would be obliged to call upon
companies which were capable of undertaking those activities.
In the Conference's First Committee at the Caracas Session,
the Group of 77 introduced a compromise proposal. It provided
that all activities in the international area should be conducted
directly by the Authority, which could allocate certain tasks to
juridical or natural persons. Consequently, the Authority would
be the sole representative of mankind and the sole exploiter of the
seabed resources.
However, lacking financial and technical
means at present and being determined to commence functioning
immediately, the Authority would act through those who possessed
the requisite finance and technology. Due weight was given to
such a compromise formula in the Informal Single Negotiating
Text presented by the chairman of the First Committee at the
Geneva Session.
Articles 22 and 23 of the Geneva negotiating text refer to the
functions of the Authority." Under Article 22, paragraph 1, all
activities in the areas of the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil
20 Negotiating Text, pt. 1, at 9-10.
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thereof shall be conducted directly by the Authority. Following
the suggestion of the Group of 77, paragraph 2 of the same Article
provides flexibility in carrying out such activities. 21 Under Article
23, discrimination in the granting of opportunities for activities is to
be avoided. However, special consideration by the Authority for
the interests and needs of the developing countries, and particularly
the land-locked countries, is not to be deemed discriminatory.
Finally, the Authority shall ensure the equitable sharing by states
in the benefits derived from activities in the Area. Article 24
establishes as the principal organs of the Authority an Assembly,
a Council, a Tribunal, an Enterprise and a Secretariat. The Enterprise is charged with the responsibility of preparing and executing
the activities of the Authority in the Area, pursuant to Article 22,
(i.e., to take commercial partners for joint ventures, joint financing and service contracts). The most important objective is the
equitable sharing of revenues. To attain this objective, sufficient
profits should accrue to the Authority for the economically disadvantaged countries.
Confidence in the International Authority will depend upon
its success in balancing revenues and expenses. From the negotiating text it appears that the Authority would need vast funds for
numerous staff, technical equipment, laboratories, factories, other
installations and the sustaining of its own ships. Furthermore,
the enterprises engaged in joint ventures or as national partners
will have to receive in exchange an equitable return on their investments. Those opposing a 200-mile economic zone did not hesitate to contend that the concept of the common heritage of mankind would remain valid only if the Area is sufficiently vast and
if profitable exploitation of seabed resources is reserved to the
international community. Even more pessimistic opinions expressed that if the continental shelf were beyond the economic
zone, the Area would be circumscribed to the abysmal depths.
The Area would be reduced to the parts of the submarine lands
which would be unexplorable for a long time. Therefore, the
new concept would lose most of its weight in a political as well as
a legal sense. 22 At the close of the Geneva Session, the delegation from Czechoslovakia introduced draft articles that prescribed
the distribution of the revenue collected by the International Authority: 10 percent shall be accumulated as a fund for price
stabilization schemes; 35 percent shall be distributed among all
21
22

See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.7 (Aug. 16, 1974).
M. MILI6, supra note 19, at 6.
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developing countries; 25 percent shall be distributed among all landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states (two-thirds for landlocked and one-third for geographically disadvantaged states); and
23
20 percent among all states.
VII.

LEGAL ISSUES

Article 73 provides for provisional application of the Convention. It states, "pending the definitive entry into force of this
Convention . . . a state may notify upon signing the Convention
.. . that it will apply the Convention provisionally and that it
will undertake to seek ratification . . . as rapidly as possible."' 2
The proposal was introduced by the United States to find a provisional solution for pending U.S. draft legislation designed to
provide interested members of the U.S. industrial community with
a variety of assurances that the delay of the permanent solution
would not cause them to lose large investments. Even more importantly, the proposal was to prevent the major powers from
initiating exploitation by providing interim legislation prior to the
conclusion of the Convention. The provisional application of the
future Law of the Sea Convention would not be a novelty in international practice. Special situations, particularly in the economic
domain, have required prompt application after signature and
before ratification. Under Article 25 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties of 1969, the provisional application of inPreviously it was
ternational treaties received a legal basis.
treated as a customary practice. The legal nature of the provisional application was left unexplained as was the question of the
retroactive effect of ratification.
A more important and difficult question also arises from the
Vienna Convention: What effect is to be given to the participation in the sharing of benefits to the states which do not adhere
to the Convention? Under the general rule in Article 34 of the
Vienna Convention a treaty does not create either obligations or
rights for a third state without its consent. The chairman of
the Working Group, Mr. Pinto, found the solution in Article 36
of the Vienna Convention which provided that a right might arise
for third states under a treaty in certain specified circumstances.
Furthermore, Mr. Pinto mentioned that:
[Slome held the view that, since the resources of the area were
the common heritage of mankind, all States, whether or not
23 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.13 (April 28, 1975).

Negotiating Text, pt. 1, at 28.
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parties to the convention, should have the right to participate
in exploration and exploitation, provided they undertook to accept the Authority's conditions.25
Moreover, if the legal nature of common heritage is viewed as
an undivided legacy of joint heirs, states should be entitled to assert
jure propio their rights to submarine resources.
Membership in
the future universal organization governing submarine areas should
be considered as automatic for all states. That means there will
be neither formal admissions nor withdrawal notifications. Since
this universal community will design its administrative machinery
for equity, all states will enjoy protection of their interests whether
they request it or not.2
VIII.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Third Conference is unprecedented in its search to replace
a regime for the oceans and to create an equitable order keeping
a balance between the economically advanced and disadvantaged
countries. The second substantive session at Geneva closed without satisfying the urgent need for a convention, but there was some
progress, albeit slow and limited. Three negotiating texts were
drawn up by the chairmen of the Conference's main committees.
These constitute a draft treaty on which agreement will be sought
at the next session in New York.
Although some differences on details may persist, there is no
longer justification for doubt concerning the soundness of the territorial offshore limit of a state's sovereignty, the concept of the
exclusive economic zone, free access to and from the sea for landlocked, shelf-locked and other geographically disadvantaged countries, an Authority governing the exploitation of the underwater
resources in the international ocean area, and prevention of pollution. In the sensitive area of navigation through straits, the great
maritime powers may feel their desires for unimpeded transit are
satisfied by the formula of transit passage.
A correct estimate of the Conference's success cannot be based
solely upon a lawyer's contentions about juridical formulas. It
is neither possible nor intended to achieve the formulation of the
rules of the law of the sea without solution of the sharpened economic problems and changed political relations. The increasing
preoccupation of the developing countries with income distribution
25 U.N. Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Vol. 11, Sunmary Records
of Meetings of Committees, at 85 (1975).
26M. MILI6, supra note 19, at 23-24.
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on an international basis is predominant in
tions. The great hope for New York lies
and the recognition by all participants that
to the general interest will contribute to the
the Sea Conference.

global political relain the good will of
their accommodation
success of the Law of
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